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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

J. WILLIAM RANDALL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
TRACY COLLINS TRUST COMpANY, Executor of the Estate of
SARAH P. RANDALL BRERETON,
Deceased,

Civil No. 8430

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from a decree of Judge William
Stanley Dunford ordering specific performance of
a contract of the late Sarah P. Randall Brereton
with her nephew, the plaintiff, J. William Randall,
concerning, primarily, the controlling stock interest
of the State Bank of Provo. Both the trial court in
its Memorandum Decision (R. 34) and the advisory
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jury, in reply to specific interrogatories submitted
to it by the court (R. 32) found the factual issues
in favor of plaintiff.
Mrs. Brereton was 95 at the time of her death
in 1954. She had been a widow since 1938 and had
succeeded her husband as president and principal
stockholder in the State Bank of Provo. She early
evidenced a desire to have an arrangement whereby
she and her affairs would be cared for for the rest
of her life; and in 1939, proposed to her niece, Mildred H. Brereton, that if she would take care of her
for the rest of her life, she would leave all her property to her niece. Mildred rejected this offer because Mrs. Brereton's demands "were so intense I
felt I couldn't follow them out * * * I felt I couldn't
live a life of my own or have a home of my own
* * * the demands she made of me were too great."
(T. 15)
Mrs. Brereton then turned to the plaintiff, her
nephew Will, to induce him to dispose of his Ogden
interests and come down to Provo to take over her
personal and business affairs. While she was at
first unsuccessful in persuading plaintiff, he did,
during the next few years, render numerous services to her for which she showed her gratitude by
gifts to him of property.
In the spring of 1946, Mrs. Brereton, then
eighty-seven, finally persuaded plaintiff and they
2
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entered into an oral agreement described in the
Findings of Fact ( 1) of the Court as follows:
"That between April 1 and September
1, 1946, plaintiff and Sarah P. Randall Brereton entered in to an oral agreement by the
terms of which the said Sarah P. Randall
Brereton agreed that if plaintiff would sell
his home and leave his business in Ogden,
Utah, move with his family to Provo, Utah,
become an employee of the State Bank of
Provo and would devote his time, talents,
energy and attention during her lifetime to
caring for her business and financial affairs,
particularly her bank, giving her advice and
counsel in respect to other rna tters and caring
for her personal affairs such as rendering her
personal services, care and attention, caring
for her home, furnishing her companionship,
meals, protection during illness and the maintenance of her home and grounds in an efficient operating condition, that upon her death
she would leave to him by her will her home
in Provo and her stock constituting controlling interest in the State Bank of Provo. (R.
60)
Plaintiff "completely and fully" (R. 47) performed his side of the agreement, and for the balance of her lifetime, and until the day of her death,
he so devoted his time, talent, energy and attention
to her and her affairs, that neither he nor his family
were able to enjoy a normal family and social relationship (T. 88-92).
At about the time this oral agreement was made
between plaintiff and Mrs. Brereton, she, in ac3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cordance therwith, changed her will so that it provided that the plaintiff would receive, as residuary
l~gatee, the Bank stock and the home in Provo.
(T. 6)
However, in 1951, when she was over ninety,
unbeknown to plaintiff and her other relatives and
friends, and without using the usual channels of the
Tracy-Collins Trust Company, as she had in the
preparation of her will and earlier codicils, but by
the use of new counsel from Bountiful, where Ross
Richards lived, Mrs. Brereton executed a new codicil leaving all of her property to Ross Richards and
disinheriting plaintiff entirely, except for the old
home in Provo.
When the existence of this secret codicil was
discovered on her death, plaintiff promptly filed
claim against the estate for specific performance of
his contract with Mrs. Brereton. When the Executor denied the claim, this suit was brought.
This action being one in equity for specific
performance, the issues, both as to the facts and
the law, were tried to the court. Because of the issues
of fact to be determined in the establishment of the
contract and its performance by plaintiff, the court
enlisted the aid of an advisory jury. For this purpose, the court submitted the following five special
questions to the jury under instructions placing on
plaintiff the burden of proving the affirmative
4
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answers to these questions by "clear and convincing" evidence. ( R. 15) Under such instructions, the
jury unanimously found the answers to each of these
questions in the affirmative:
"1. Was there an oral agreement made between the plaintiff and Sarah P. Randall
Brereton, deceased, between April 1 and September 1, 1956?

"2. If there was an agreement, was it agreed
that the plaintiff would sell his home and
leave his business in Ogden, Utah and move
to Provo, Utah and become an employee of
the State Bank of Provo, and devote his time
and attention to the personal and financial
affairs of the deceased during her lifetime?
"3. Was it agreed that in consideration of
plaintiff's doing as set forth in interrogatory
#2 above, that the decedent, by her last will
and testament, would leave her home and
bank stock in the State Bank of Provo to the
plaintiff?
"4. If the answers to 1 and 2 are 'yes', did
plaintiff, in accordance with such agreement,
sell his home and leave his business in Ogden,
Utah and move to Provo, Utah, and accept a
position with the State Bank of Provo, and
devote his time and attention to the personal
and financial affairs of the decedent during
the remainder of her lifetime?
"5. If your answer to interrogatory #4 is
'yes', were the acts and conduct of the plaintiff in compliance with such contract of such
5
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a nature that their value cannot be measured
in money? (Verdict, R. 32-33)
After opportunity was had for counsel and
court to secure and examine copies of the transcript
of the evidence, the issues of fact and law were
argued to the court. The matter was then taken
under advisement and the court subsequently issued
its Memorandum Decision, finding the issues of
fact and law in favor of the plaintiff. In accordance
with this Memorandum Decision, a decree was
entered specifically enforcing the contract and directing the defendant-executor to deliver over the
bank stock and home to plaintiff.
It is from this decree based on evidence which
has passed the test of "clear and convincing" before
both the jury and the trial court, that this appeal
is taken.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF THE CONTRACT WAS CLEAR AND CONVINCING AND THE CONTRACT ITSELF WAS SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE AND CERTAIN FOR SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE.
A.

The services rendered by plaintiff cannot be
measured in money.

B.

The Statute of Frauds is not applicable.
6
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POINT III. THE RULINGS ON THE ADMISSION
OF EVIDENCE WERE CORRECT.
POINT IV. THE USE OF THE JURY WAS PROPER.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT.

In appellant's brief under Point I, attack is
made on both the pleadings and the evidence. From
what is said on pages 10-13 of that brief with respect to the pleadings, it is assumed that what appellant contends is that the words "personal affairs"
as used in the complaint, are not broad enough to
include an allegation that the plaintiff had agreed
to render to decedent, Sarah P. Randall Brereton
the personal services, care and attention as detailed
in paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact. It would
appear to be the height of sophistry to contend
seriously that "affairs", meaning, according to Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed., "that
which is done or is to be done", is not a short and
plain statement of the claim as required by Rule 8
(a), URCP. See Wilson v. Olroyd, 1 U. 2d 362, 267
P. 2d 759. In any event, under Rule 15 (b), this
question of semantics need give no further pause.
Seamens v. Anderson, 252 P. 2d 209, 212 (Utah,
1952). The fact that we have devoted this much
space to answering this first item of plaintiff's statement of points is only to indicate that this first point
7
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has about as much merit as the remaining seven.
Appellant then devotes over ten pages in purporting to review the evidence to indicate its insufficiency to support the judgment. This guerilla attack of a voiding the main body and detouring the
strong points can hardly support the statement made
on page 13 of appellant's brief that "there is very
little, if any competent and material testimony"
of the existence of the agreement between Mrs.
Brereton and plaintiff.
A more pedestrian yet fairer approach to the
issue raised as to the sufficiency of the evidence
would be to do as the trial coud did in its Memorandum Decision, and review the testimony of each of
the witnesses, bearing in mind the five ultimate issues of fact raised by the five special interrogatories submitted to the jury. (supra, p. 5)
First of all, consider the will itself and the codicils thereto which were identified and explained by
the trust officer of Tracy-Collins Trust Company,
the executor. Mrs. Brereton's will was executed in
April, 1940. By its terms, the bank stock was left
in trust for ten years, the beneficiary during the
trust as well as the remainderman being her nephew,
the plaintiff herein. The first codicil in June, 1941,
made no change with respect to the Bank stock. The
second codicil in August, 1941, changed the terms
of the trust so that if plaintiff did not survive the
8
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ten year term, the stock was to be distributed to
others. The third codicil was executed on May 7,
1946. It cancelled the trust so that the bank stock
and the home would pass directly to plaintiff as the
residuary legatee of the will. This change is an affirmation of the agreement in issue made at about
the same time between Mrs. Brereton and her
nephew, the plaintiff (Finding, No. 3, R. 61). The
final, secret codicil, in October, 1951, cancelled the
bequest to J. Will Randall and left the residue of
the estate to one, Ross Richards, a half cousin of
Mrs. Brereton.
The next witness was Mildred H. Brereton. She
was a niece of Mrs. Brereton and had married a
nephew of Mr. Brereton. Both she and her husband
had visited Mrs. Brereton, referred to in the testimony as Aunt Sade, on numerous and frequent occasions and Mildred had lived with her aunt prior
to her marriage. Mildred testified to an offer of her
aunt made to her in 1939 (T. 15) and to a trip Mrs.
Brereton made to Ogden that same year to induce the
plaintiff, without success, to go to Provo and look
after her personal affairs. ( T. 17) She also testified
to the idiosyncrasies and demands of Mrs. Brereton
which became more exacting and more difficult as
she grew older. (T. 20) She stated that Aunt Sade
frequently mentioned that her plan was to have
Will come down and take over her interests. Finally
9
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in the spring of 1946, when Mildred was working
for a real estate company in Provo, Aunt Sade told
her to look out for a house for Will as he was coming
to Provo (TR-22); that she had worked out an
agreement with him, that he was to take over her
business and personal affairs and, in return, was
to get the bank stock and her home. ( Tr. 22-3)
Aunt Sade referred to this agreement "frequently".
( T. 23-27). Mildred especially remembered three
occasions when it was discussed by Aunt Sade. Once,
when the bank was being re-capitalized (T. 23), once
when Will had taken Aunt Sade's lunch to her when
Mildred was visiting and Aunt Sade had said in
response to a comment, "Yes, they are good to me.
They look after my needs, but they owe it to me because of my agreement". (T. 24) The third occasion was when her husband offered to fix the furnace on a cold day and Mrs. Brereton said it was
"Will's job." (T. 24) Mildred even stated that Mrs.
Brereton had told her of the agreement "so definitely that I thought it was in writing until this will
was read. I had no idea it wasn't written up." (T.
35)
She testified that Will came down in September,
1946, and took over management of the Bank. (T.
23) Mildred also testified that the personal care
Will and his wife rendered Aunt Sade included fixing the furnace, caring for the house and lawn, doing
10
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her washing and ironing, fixing lunches and having
her at their home for dinner, spending Sundays with
her, staying with her at night for periods as long as
a month at a time when she was ill and during intervals after a housekeeper had quit and generally
looking after all of her "personal affairs" ( T. 26).
Mildred further testified that Mrs. Brereton
failed rapidly after her illness in 1950 when she was
ninety-one, but that in 1951 Aunt Sade had told her
that she couldn't change her will after she was
eighty, but that she had attached a codicil on it to
make Ross Richards the administrator of her estate
(T. 27). It takes little inference from that naive
statement and consideration of Mrs. Brereton's failing strength of mind and body to understand how
the execution of the secret 1951 codicil came into
being, and to conclude that Mrs. Brereton had not
intended thereby to violate her agreement with Will
Randall.
Cross examination of Mildred developed only
that Mrs. Brereton both before and after 1946, had
had numerous housekeepers, off and on, ( T. 32) some
who stayed at night only; that these women would
"just leave" on short notice after they "would get
so discouraged trying to satisfy Aunt Sade ; ( T. 25)
and that Mr. and Mrs. Randall stayed with her
night and day during intervals between housekeepers. (T. 34) It was also shown on cross examination
11
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that Mildred's opportunity to observe was based on
weekly or mol).thly visits to her aunt at her home in
Provo. (T. 33)
The next two witnesses A. E. Money and Charles
H. Dixon, were officers in the Commercial Bank of
Utah at Spanish Fork. They both testified that in
1940 they approached Mrs. Brereton about buying
her interest in the State Bank of Provo, that she put
them off at that time because she liked being bank
president, but invited them to come back and talk the
matter over with her later on. They approached her
again in the late summer or early fall of 1946, just
before or just after Mr. Randall came down to take
over operation of the bank. At that time, she told
them she had turned her interests over to Mr. Randall and that he was coming down to take care of
the bank interests and also to take care of her, and
that she was well along in years and had to have
some one look after her. (T. 39-41) Both of these
gentlemen were so certain in their minds, after
this second conversation, that Mrs. Brereton had
made a "deal" with Will, that they dropped the proposed purchase project. On cross examination Mr.
Dixon stated that he had expressed surprise to learn
that there was "any disagreement as to his [Mr.
Randall] being able to procure her interest in the
bank." (T. 44)
Mrs. Zenger, the wife of the superintendent
12
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of the Utah Valley Hospital testified to having observed the Randalls daily taking Mrs. Randall's
meals to her (Mildred Brereton having mentioned
in her testimony that Aunt Sade kept no food in the
house, using the refrigerator to store dishtowels),
or bringing her to their home for dinner. Mrs. Zenger had become acquainted with Mrs. Brereton in
1949 when the old lady had made a gift to the hospital and she visited with her about fifteen times
between that occasion and 1953. During these visits
Mrs. Zenger frequently remarked on the care, attention and services Mrs. Brereton was receiving
from Will and his wife, Bea. To these remarks Mrs.
Brereton replied: "That she knew she was lucky, but
felt she had it coming to her because the Randalls
were going to be taken care of" ( T. 50).
Will Brereton, the husband of Mildred, and a
grandnephew of Aunt Sade's husband, also had
visited Aunt Sade frequently both with his wife,
Mildred, and on other occasions by himself. On these
visits Mrs. Brereton had mentioned the agreement
with Will Randall on several instances-the gist
of the agreement being that Will was to get the
bank stock and home in return for taking care of her
and her business. On cross examination counsel tried
to confuse the witness with reference to his description of the agreement in his deposition. But despite
such tactics the witness was "definite"that the
13
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agreement included her home and her bank and that
Will was to look after her affairs. ( T. 66)
Appellant asserts in his brief that the testimony of Mr. Brereton was "vague, uncertain and
contradictory". It may be admitted that the statements of any witness as to the terms of an oral
agreement related to him in casual conversation by
one of the parties would not be as certain as a written document, but we submit that this witness was
certain in his mind as to the impression thereof
she did give him-that she had an agreement with
Will Randall-that under its terms, he was to look
after her affairs and in return, receive her home
and bank stock. It might be observed that any more
explicit description might well raise in the mind
of the trier of the facts a question as to the credibility of a witness's testimony as to the conversations had some years earlier.
Clyde Sandgren testified as to conversations he
had with Mrs. Brereton while he was acting as attorney for the Bank in a recapitalization program.
Leaving aside the voir dire examination on the issue
as to the confidential attorney-client relationship
raised by appellant, Mr. Sandgren testified that
Mrs. Brereton told him she had promised to leave
Will Randall a controlling interest in the Bank
through her will in return for coming to Provo to
look after her interests. ( T. 81)
14
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Appellant contends that the testimony of Sandgren, Dixon and Money does not establish the existence of the contract as these witnesses refer only
to the Bank stock in their description of the agreement of which Mrs. Brereton had told them. Of
course, that is all that Mrs. Brereton mentioned to
them, as that is all they were interested in! Plaintiff does not contend that each witness proved alt
the terms of the contract or its performance by him.
It is Hornbook law that the evidence must be looked
at as a whole. The testimony of Sandgren, Dixon
and Money described conversations where the William Randall "deal" with respect to the Bank stock
came up naturally, as an explanation for Mrs. Brereton's position with respect to sale of stock or recapitalization of the Bank. The other witnesses,
Mildred Brereton, Will Brereton and Mrs. Zenger
had natural occasions to discuss with Mrs. Brereton other aspects of the contract and its performance
by plaintiff. The testimony of all of them together,
clearly and convincingly established the contract, its
terms, and its full performance by plaintiff.
Other than plaintiff, whose testimony was excluded under the "dead man" statute, (TR. 102) the
final witness was Kenneth (Kay) Randall. He testified to the close personal attention his father rendered to Mrs. Brereton until her death, to the derogation of a normal family and social life. (T. 8892).
15
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On cross examination he described her eccentricities and demands and the difficulty in keeping
housekeepers.
From a review of all the evidence, the trial
court concluded in its Memorandum Decision:
"There is no direct evidence to dispute
any of this testimony, and a careful examination of the transcript certainly would not
justify a concept that the effectiveness of the
testimony had been destroyed on cross examination. The court thus finds that after the
decedent had attempted to induce her niece to
come to Provo to live with her and care for
her in her old age, that she did make a proposal to the plaintiff to the effect that if the
plaintiff would dispose of his home and responsibilities in Ogden and would move to
Provo and would devote his time and talents,
his energies and attention to caring for her
business, particularly her bank, giving her
advice and counsel respecting other matters,
caring for her home and providing her with
personal services such as company, meals,
protection against illness, the keeping of her
home and grounds in an efficient operating
condition, that upon her death she would leave
to him, by her will, her home in Provo and
her stock in the State Bank of Provo. The
foregoing agreement is sufficiently definite
and certain, under the decisions of our own
Court, for proper remedy for its violation."
(R. 43)
Appellant cites an old case, Lake S~ore Duck
Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 P.
309 ( 1917) ' on the scope of review by this court of
16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the evidence in an equity case. It might be more accurate to accept the modern doctrine of review of
equity decrees as announced in more recent decisions
of this court.
The leading case on the subject is Stanley v.
Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465 ( 1935). With respect to the scope of review on appeal in equity
cases, the opinion of the court in that case stated:
"The scope of the review on appeal in
equity cases is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. 'This court is authorized by the state
Constitution to review the findings of the trial
courts in equity cases, but the findings of the
trial courts on conflicting evidence will not
be set aside unless it manifestly appears that
the court has misapplied proven facts or made
findings clearly against the weight of the
evidence.' Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475,
214 P. 313, 315.
"To the same effect are Klopenstine v.
Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712; Singleton v.
Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63, 66; Holman
v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 457;
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. 2d 513
101 A.L.R. 532; Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah
503, 56 P. 2d 1; Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch
Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P. 2d 234."
Mr. Justice Wolfe, in a concurring opinion reviewel at length the Utah cases on the issue and
concluded:
"In short, as held in Wilcox v. Cloward,
88 Utah 503, 56 P. 2d 1, if after we review
the record we cannot say that the court came
17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to a wrong conclusion we should affirm. We
do not reverse if we find the court's findings
supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence, or if supported only by a slight preponderance, or if the evidence is evenly balanced. Or if there is in the record a slight
preponderance the other way, for the reasons
above set out."
Examples of the application of the Stanley doctrine in recent decisions of this court include the
following:
In Morley v. Willden, et al., 120 Utah 453
(1951), -2d 500, Justice Henriod said:
The voluminous record in this case contains considerable uncontroverted and much
controverted evidence. A careful examination
thereof leads us to conclude that the trial
court's findings and decision are supported
by a fair preponderance of the evidence and
should remain undisturbed, under the principle repeatedly enunciated by this court and
reflected in Stanley v. Stanley, 1939, 97 Utah
520, 94 P. 2d 465. The judgment is affirmed
with costs to respondents."
In Perry v. McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189 (1953),
264 P. 2d 825, Justice Henriod states:
"Although we may have decided otherwise had we been the initial fact finders, we
believe and hold that there was sufficient
evidence of fraud * * * as would justify the
lower court's decision - a decision we cannot
disturb under principles enumerated by us
in Stanley v. Stanley * * *."
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Finally, in Youngren v. King, 1 Utah 2d 386,
267 P. 2d 913 ( 1954) this court said:
"This case being one in equity, we are
of the opinion that the principle and law
stated in Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94
P. 2d 465 applies. This rule is again restated
in Morley v. Willden, Utah, 235 P. 2d 500,
and this court will not disturb the decision
of the trial court unless there is an abuse of
discretion and misapplication of the evidence,
and that by reason thereof the trial court committed prejudicial error."
The issue, then, is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in finding the evidence clearly
and convincingly established the facts. It is submitted that it is clear from the record and from
the memorandum opinion of Judge Dunford that
he fully considered all the Utah cases on the subject
and correctly applied their principles.
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF THE CONTRACT WAS CLEAR AND CONVINCING AND THE CONTRACT ITSELF WAS SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE AND CERTAIN FOR SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE.

Appellant in its brief appears to confuse and
mingle two different issues. No distinction is made
between the question as to the quantum of proof required by plaintiff to prove the evidence of the contract and the question as to whether the contract,
once proven, is sufficiently definite and certain that
a court may frame a decree specifically enforcing

it.
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As to the nature of the proof necessary to es-

tablish a contract of this nature there is no dispute
and never has been. As the trial court stated in its
Memorandum of Decision, "There is no dispute between the parties as to the rule that an oral agreement sought to be established against the estate of
the decedent must be proved by the claimant by evidence which is clear and convincing." (R. p. 36)
This court has been most specific on this question.
It is well established that the existence of such a
contract must be proved with "a greater degree of
certainty than is required in an action at law,"
Clark v. George, 120 Utah 350, 234 P. 2d 844 at 848.
The quantum of proof required has been variously
described but suffice it to say that it must be something more than a mere preponderance-in other
words, it must be 'clear and convincing' VanNatta
v. Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192, at p. 194, cf.
Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co. 286 P. 2d
1065. This phrase is the most generally accepted
wording for a standard of proof over and above
that generally required in a civil action. This
Court has made no distinction between this test and
the term 'clear, unequivocal and convincing', but
treats them as having synonymous meaning. (e.g. 'if
the evidence of invalidity is clear and convincing, or,
as has sometimes been said by this Court, 'clear, unequivocal and convincing.' Ulibarri v. Christenson,
2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P. 2d 170, 1954.")
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It was this standard which was given to the
advisory jury (R. p. 15, Inst #2) and the one accepted and applied by the trial judge. The application of this rule to the facts has been made. As we
have shown above, unless appellant can show abuse
of this application within the scope of this court's
duty to review the facts in such case, the finding
must stand.
It is submitted that by any standard there
could be no question in this case as to the existence
of a contract between plaintiff and defendent. Each
witness who knew the decedent spoke of such a contract, whether they termed it a "deal", "understanding", "obligation", or simply an "agreement".
There was no disputing their testimony, nor were
they shaken or weakened with regard to this point in
cross examination. This evidence was corroborated
by the codicil executed shortly before plaintiff's
moving to Provo by which plaintiff was left the
property, the subject of his agreement. See 69 A.L.R.
202. Nor did a unanimous advisory jury and the
trial judge find any difficulties in determining the
existence of the basic terms of the contract under
the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.
Nor do we quarrel with the well-established
rule cited by appellant that "neither the court
nor the jury can make an agreement for the parties."
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Andrews v. Aiken, 44 Idaho 797, 260 P. 423, 69
A.L.R. 14. The court must know what the terms of
the agreement are in order to frame its decree. As
this court has said:
"While it is not essential that all the
elements of the contract should be detailed as
having been formally declared or expressed
by the parties, yet from all the facts and circumstances as disclosed by the evidence the
chancellor must be able to read sufficient
terms and conditions to make a definite and
complete contract and one founded upon a
valuable consideration." Price v. Lloyd, 31
Utah 86, 86 P. 767.
But what are the uncertainties claimed here?
Plaintiff alleged that Mrs. Brereton agreed that in
exchange for services to be rendered her by plaintiff that she would "leave to him by Last Will and
Testament all her stock in the said State Bank of
Provo which she should own at the time of her
death, together with her residence in Provo, Utah."
(Complaint R. p. 4) The advisory jury by special
interrogatories #2 and #3 found that decedent so
agreed. ( R. p. 32) What uncertainty is there in
such an agreement which precludes the drafting of
a decree? The trial court found none, ( R. 43) as
its decree (R. 52) shows. The house in Provo was
easily ascertained. There is no dispute as to the
number of shares of bank stock involved. Appellant
in grasping for alleged elements of uncertainty asks
only three questions (Appellant's Brief p. 25). First,
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it is asked "was the Plaintiff to receive the bank
stock and home of decedent or was he to receive all
of her property?" Obviously, as found and alleged,
Plaintiff was to receive only the bank stock and the
house.
Secondly, it is asked "did decedent understand
that she was not merely promising specifically to
do something now, relinquishing her rights subsequently to change her mind if she so desired?"
vVhat the decedent's state of mind was, has, it is
submitted, no bearing on the certainty of the terms
of the understanding between the parties. In any
event the issue is, of course, not the subjective one of
what decedent understood, but what she in fact did.
Plaintiff has alleged and the trial court has found
that the parties made an agreement which created
an in praesenti interest for consideration, rather
than a mere ambulatory revocable statement of disposition.
Thirdly, it is asked, "Was the Plaintiff moving
from Ogden to Provo to take a job in the bank for
his own financial and pecuniary benefit or for the
financial and pecuniary benefit of the decedent?"
Again it is difficult to see how this bears on the
certainty of the terms of the agreement. Indeed, it
would seem unnecessary to have to decide alternatively whether the contract benefited Plaintiff or
decedent. Assumedly the move benefited both par23
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ties-most contracts are entered into with the concept of mutual benefit.
The question before the court should be whether
plaintiff proved the existence of a contract, and if
such contract, as proved, is sufficiently definite so
the court can enforce it. Each portion of evidence
does not have to confirm the alleged contract in detail. Thus, in Van N atta vs. Heywood, supra, plaintiff sued for specific performance of a contract
allegedly to devise and bequeath the residue of decedent's estate, less a $500 amount. The fact that
several of the witnesses testified to an agreement
by which plaintiff was to get the entire estate, thus
not confirming the exact contract as alleged by
plaintiff, was treated by this court as corroborative
of plaintiff's allegations and not as a sign of inconsistency. To hold that a witness' failure to corroborate each and every detail of an alleged contract is a basis for impeachment of the contract on
grounds of uncertainty would mean that a claimant
could use witnesses only at his extreme peril. It
would make the discovery of acceptable witnesses,
already taxed by the Dead Man Statute, all but impossible, Lovett v. Continental Bank and Trust
Co .. supra. The bizarre result of such logic is its own
answer.
A.

The services rendered by plaintiff cannot
be measured in money.
24
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At the insistence of Appellant's counsel, the advisory jury was asked to determine whether the
acts and conduct of plaintiff, the evidence of which
the jury had heard, was "of such nature that their
value cannot be measured in money." (Verdict, Sp.
Inter. No. 5, R. p. 33) The advisory jury answered
affirmatively. The trial court after extensive review of the evidence stated in its Memorandum of
Decision: "Clearly this type of service is completely
adequate to meet the requirements of authorities
cited and to establish that there would be no adequate remedy in damages." ( R. p. 46).
A laborious review of the services rendered by
plaintiff is unnecessary because Appellant's argument is disposed of by its own brief. Appellant concedes the type of services which are measurable by
money are those which can be procured from a
hired servant (Appellant's Brief p. 28). Appellant
then reprints testimony as to the succession of housekeepers who stayed with Mrs. Brereton. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 30-31) In other words, Mrs. Brereton had
hired servants in her house and continued to employ
them after plaintiff's arrival in Provo. What more
convincing evidence is there that the services which
decedent expected from Plaintiff were something
more than mere menial tasks to be measured in
money. In addition, we must remember that we are
not dealing here with the claim of a nurse, hired
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man or janitor. We are discussing the services rendered by a nephew who was sought out by Mrs.
Brereton as someone whom she could trust and rely
upon and who could and would perform significant
executive functions in the bank and act as financial
confidant and advisor. ( TR 30)
The services required to permit specific performance are those "as to invoke the conscience of
the court in behalf of the promisee". ( 69 A.L.R. 57)
" ... it must appear that the obligation
assumed by the promise require some sacrifice upon his part but it is not essential that
the performance should involve a pecuniary
sacrifice on the promisee's part; the fact that
he was previously in humble circumstances, so
that the position was in itself advantageous,
is not sufficient to warrant a denial of relief
if the promisee has fully and faithfully carried out the obligations he assumed, and they
were of a character, the value of which cannot be estimated by any pecuniary standard."
(69 A.L.R. 58-59, emphasis added)
As the Supreme Court of Idaho stated:
"From all the testimony it is shown that
deceased did not want respondent for any sort
of menial services alone, and the question is
not presented by the pleadings but that he
wanted her to brighten his life, and to take
her place in his home again as his own child,
and the deceased was the best judge of the
value of these things. The loss to respondent
of the companionship of Mrs. Peterson and
the value to the deceased of the child living
26
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with him cannot be measured or compensated
for in money, and such pay was not contemplated by deceased ... It is clearly established
that deceased made the contract, and that respondent had performed her part, and, while
the services performed in the home by respondent in the way of household duties might
possibly have been compensated in money,
those things that respondent gave up, and the
value of respondent living with the deceased
as his child, are impossible of measurement in
money value, and respondent cannot be placed
in statu quo. The only way possible of compensating respondent is by specific performance of the contract, or doing what the
decedent wished and agreed to do." (White v.
Smith, (Idaho) 253 P. 849, 854)
Appellant seems to make much of the fact that
Plaintiff did not live in the same house with decedent.
Whether service is of a personal or even filial
nature cannot be measured by mere mechanical tests,
such as the place where the promisee lives while
rendering the services. The nature of the services
has no relation to the place the promisee lays his
head at night, nor do the authorities so hold. (See
69 A.L.R. 57 et seq)
Not only does the law not require a common
residence in order to establish a sufficiently intimate
relationship between the parties, but the evidence
makes it quite clear that the instant agreement
betwen the plaintiff and decedent specifically did
27
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not contain such a provision. Thus Mildred Brereton
testified ( TR. 22) that while she was working in
a real estate office at about the time plaintiff moved
down to Provo in accordance with the agreement,
decedent requested that the witness look around
for a house for plaintiff's family located close by
that of decedent. It is clear from this that decedent
never anticipated nor expected plaintiff to share her
house with her.
The evidence is undisputed that plaintiff and
his family worked ceaselessly for the care and comfort of decedent, not only performing certain menial
tasks, but providing her with companionship and
personal attention under most demanding circumstances. Plaintiff clearly conformed his life and
that of his family to these attentions. The Trial
Judge in his Memorandum ( R. 45-6) ably summarizes the nature of plaintiff's services and the
sacrifices he made which made money damages inadequate.
B.

The Statute of Fraud is not applicable.

Appellant devotes the principal portion of its
section of the brief on the Statute of Frauds to a
re-argument as to whether the services were measurable in money. Except for a reference in one quotation, the issue of part performance, which is dispositive of this issue, is not mentioned.
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Section 25-5-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro·
vides as follows :
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall
be construed to abridge the powers of courts
to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof."
The Utah Supreme Court has at least twice
summarily dismissed arguments addressed to the
statute of frauds in fact situations similar to this.
VanCott v. Brinton, 33 P. 218; VanNatta v. Heywood, supra. As the court said in VanNatta v. Heywood:
"Nor do we think that under the undisputed facts and circumstances as shown by
the record this is a case coming within the
statute of frauds ... The contract between
the deceased and the plaintiff, although an
oral one, was taken out of the statute of
frauds by reason of part performance by the
plaintiff."
We are not dealing with a mere executory contract in the instant case. The contract was fully
performed in every sense of the term by plaintiff.
The evidence evinced at the trial does nothing but
corroborate plaintiff's contention that he fully
performed his obligation under the contract. The
trial court wholly concurred in its analysis. ( R. 47)
Appellant cites the case of Startin v. Madsen,
(1951) 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834. We need only
point to the obvious distinction in this case from
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the instant one, which the trial judge ably pointed
out:
"The Defendent refers us to Startin
v. Madsen, but two things distinguish that
case from the instant one. In the first place,
the Plaintiff at no time maintained that her
compensation was immeasurable, but sued for
a specific amount, and, second, there was no
contract claimed between the parties by which
the decedents promised to leave property to
the person performing the services and in
compensation thereof." (R. p. 46)
Appellant cites an Illinois case which states
that the bar of the Statute of Frauds is not removed
by part performance if the services sued on are not
unique, but measurable in money. Hols v. Stephen
362 Ill. 527, 200 NE 601. Plaintiff does not dispute
this proposition. But either plaintiff's services are
not unique, in which event he had no right to bring
this action in equity anyway, or they are not measurable in money, as the advisory jury and trial court
found. If the former is true plaintiff's case has
failed before reaching the question of the Statute of
Frauds. The very case cited by appellant concedes
that if such services are unique, a matter concerning which we have already given detailed discussion,
part performance eliminates any issue as to the
Statute of Frauds. Thus by appellant's own authorities, the Statute of Frauds presents no question not
already resolved.
30
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POINT III. THE RULINGS ON THE ADMISSION
OF EVIDENCE WERE CORRECT.

Appellant raises two issues as to the rulings of
the trial court on the admissibility of evidence. The
first refers to refusal of the court to allow the son
of the plaintiff, Kenneth Randall, to testify as to
the salary his father was receiving as an officer
of the State Bank of Provo. Appellant coupled· his
statement as to the relevancy of that fact with
reference to the quality of plaintiff's home in Provo
as compared with his former home in Ogden (T.
96). Yet, when Kay testified as to the comparative
sales price of the two homes (T. 108) appellant's
counsel objected on the grounds of hearsay, immateriality and irrelevance (T. 109). Surely, Kay's
testimony as to the salary his father received is
subject to the same objections!
It is submitted that the trial court's ruling on
the salary question adequately disposes of the issue.
Judge Dunford said:
"THE COURT: I think probably everybody in the courtroom, between those years,
got more than they did before. I don't think
it has any significance at all what he was
paid. We don't know what his duties were. It
is a collateral issue. Maybe he had a lot of
extra duties given to him by the bank at the
time he went in there. We won't go into that.
It will be sustained."
Appellant's second issue on rulings of the trial
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court relates to the testimony of Clyde Sandgren.
Mr. ·Sandgren, a Provo attorney, testified as to conversations with Mrs. Brereton in the course of which
she described the contract with plaintiff. The first
of these conversations was in May, 1949 while he
was employed by the State Bank of Provo to handle
a recapitalization matter for the bank. The second
was on July 12, 1949, in the course of a social ride
to Payson (T. 81).
The following day Mrs. Brereton employed Mr.
Sandgren to advise her in connection with her will.
In the course of such service he prepared a letter to
Tracy-Collins Trust Company (Exhibit "A"). This
letter was admitted without objection by appellant
and appellant's counsel proceeded to cross examine
Mr. Sandgren relative to communications from Mrs.
Brerton to him concerning the preparation of this
letter and the problems presented by her will (T.
82-84). Certainly, if any privilege there was, counsel for appellant waived it by examining Mr. Sandgren as to conversations with Mrs. Brereton after
he was employed by her. In offering Sandgren's
testimony, plaintiff was careful to confine it to the
period before July 13th, the date Mr. Sandgren
fixed as beginning his employment. It is submitted
that appellant, by going into the clearly privileged
conversations, has waived any privilege growing
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out of the relationship between Mrs. Brereton and
Sandgren.
But in any event, there was no privilege as to
the early conversations on May 4th and July 12th.
The attorney-client relationship between Mrs. Brereton and Mr. Sandgren had not commenced until
that date. As recognized by this court in Burton v.
McLaughlin, 117 Utah 483, 217 P. 2d 566, and by
Wigmore's great work on Evidence, § 2304, a communication is not privileged if made before the relationship was entered into or after it was ended. The
trial court so ruled in admitting the evidence ( T. 80
and 104). With respect to the conversations on the
social ride to Payson, the comment of Professor
Wigmore is particularly apt:
"Sec. 2303. An attorney may often be
brought into a conversation upon the law
without any purpose of treating his expression of opinion as a service rendered professionally. Such a conversation is not privileged,
because the reason for the privilege is to
secure only the freedom of resort to an attorney where some applicable interest of the
client is to be protected and the advice is
sought or given with a view to its protection."
The approach to the claim of privilege is well
stated in City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P: 2d 26, 25 ALR
2d, 1418, cited by appellant. The California court
in that case stated: (1) that the privilege is strictly
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construed since it suppresses relevant facts that
may be necessary for a just decision, (2) the privilege cannot be invoked unless the client intended
the communication to be confidential (here Sandgren testified only to the same thing Mrs. Brereton
had told numerous other people), and ( 3) only communications made to an attorney in the course of
his professional employment are privileged (here
all plaintiff asked of Sandgren was with respect to
conversations before any employment by Mrs. Brereton).
It should also be pointed out that Mr. Sandgren's testimony was merely corroborative of other
witnesses and the Memorandum of the trial judge
would indicate that he gave no greater weight to
that testimony than he did to others. If the court
erred in any respect as to the admissibility of Sandgren's testimony, it was not prejudicial. It was the
court and not the jury which was the ultimate finder
of the facts.
POINT IV.
PER.

THE USE OF THE JURY WAS PRO-

Finally, appellant makes the astounding proposition that the lower court erred in using an advisory jury. We state "astounding" as the trial
court clearly kept the special function of the advisory jury in its proper place. The court asked no
general verdict but submitted five special inter34
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roga tories with appropriate instructions as to the
quantum and quality of the evidence required and
did not enter judgment on the verdict, but waited
until a transcript of the evidence was available and
then heard argument of counsel on the law and facts.
It then took the entire matter under advisement and
prepared a detailed Memorandum opinion reviewing the evidence and the law at length. It later heard
argument on the objections to the Findings of Fact
and approved certain amendments.
It is difficult to see from this record where in
any respect the court improperly delegated or sought
to avoid its duty to decide the issues of fact as well
as law.
CONCLUSION

It is submitted that under the facts and the
law of this case, the trial court reached an eminently
just decision-one amply supported by the evidence.
That decision should not be disturbed.
Respectfully submitted,
PETER W. BILLINGS
ALBERT J. COLTON
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT

& MABEY

Attorneys for Respondent
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